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Abstract	  
	  
In	  November	  2015	  the	  BBC	  Trust	  gave	   its	   final	   approval	   for	  BBC	  Three	   to	   cease	  
broadcasting	   on	   television	   in	   the	   UK	   and	   become	   an	   online-­‐only	   entity.	   The	  
decision	   is	   a	   landmark	   moment	   in	   the	   history	   of	   BBC	   Television,	   and	   has	  
significant	   implications	   for	   BBC	   planning	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   continued	   transition	  
from	  broadcast	  television	  to	  streaming	  and	  download	  services.	  In	  this	  article	  the	  
original	   proposals	   for	  BBC	   Three’s	  move	  online	   are	   assessed,	   and	  are	   discussed	  
within	  the	  wider	  context	  of	  current	  BBC	  policy.	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  the	  rationale	  used	  
for	  moving	   BBC	   Three	   online	   is	   based	   on	   arguments	   that	   vary	   in	   the	   extent	   to	  
which	   they	   are	   backed	   by	   evidence.	   It	   is	   also	   argued	   that	   the	   plans	   have	  
significant	   regulatory	   implications	   for	   the	   future	   of	   BBC	   Television	   and	   for	   the	  
television	  licence	  fee	  in	  the	  UK.	  	  
	   Keywords:	  BBC,	  BBC	  policy,	  BBC	  Three,	  online	  television,	  multi-­‐
	   platform	  approach,	  public	  service	  media,	  public	  value	  tests,	  media	  
	   regulation.	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‘It could redefine public service broadcasting in the digital age’: assessing the 
rationale for moving BBC Three online 
 
Introduction 
 
    In March 2014 the BBC first announced that its UK television channel BBC Three, 
aimed at 16-34 year olds, would cease broadcast on digital terrestrial television (DTT) 
and on other broadcasting platforms and become an online-only entity. The move was 
confirmed by the BBC Trust in November 2015, with BBC Three’s final broadcast 
taking place in February 2016. Representing a watershed moment in the BBC’s 
approach to television, the current controller of BBC Three has suggested that ‘It 
could redefine public service broadcasting in the digital age’ (Kavanagh, 2014). This 
article assesses the original case that the BBC made to its regulator the BBC Trust, 
which alongside a public consultation formed the evidence considered in the Public 
Value Test (PVT) (BBC Trust, 2014a), required as the BBC was making a significant 
change to its one of its services.  
    The coherence of the BBC’s strategy is assessed in relation to BBC Three, within 
the context of existing BBC policy and audience research published by the UK 
communications regulator Ofcom, and by the BBC and the BBC Trust. Taking a 
communications policy analysis approach (Hansen et al., 1998), a qualitative 
documentary analysis is employed to address the documents underpinning the BBC 
Trust’s decision, with a range of reports published by the BBC, the BBC Trust and 
Ofcom analysed. The only scholarly work-to-date on BBC Three’s move online – to 
this author’s knowledge – has been Doyle’s (2016) early analysis of the proposals. 
Doyle’s (2016) research was published before the BBC Trust’s decision was reached, 
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and focuses in particular on the distribution of television and the economic case for 
moving BBC Three online. The intention of this article is to extend analysis of the 
proposals by asking the following questions: to what extent does the evidence 
provided to the regulator in support of the proposals provide rationale for the decision 
reached? Is the decision to move BBC Three online as radical a decision as is being 
claimed? What might the impact of the decision be on the television licence fee, as 
people in the UK watching live TV online must still pay the licence fee? 
 
 
The BBC in the digital age and the multi-platform approach 
 
Public service broadcasters, now in most cases better termed Public Service Media 
(PSM) organisations, have been under continual pressure to justify their existence in 
the digital age almost since its outset (Steemers, 1998: 97). Marketisation, multi-
channel satellite, cable television and the Internet have in part undermined the 
rationale for PSM, with PSM organisations facing many challenges in continuing to 
secure the audience reach required for their perpetuation. In this section the trends of 
convergence and the shift to a multi-platform approach will be discussed, as well as 
trends that have shaped PSM and the television sector more generally. 
     Convergence can refer to ‘the coming together, on account of shared use of digital 
technologies, of sectors and product markets that were previously seen as distinct and 
separate’ (Doyle, 2013a: 25), with television a medium that has been relentlessly 
shaped by technological convergence (Jenkins, 2004: 34). All broadcasters have been 
required to take account of the Internet and make changes accordingly (Gripsrud, 
2010: 20). One large shift has been from linear broadcast television to the provision of 
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audio-visual ‘content’, endlessly reproducible across a number of platforms and 
endlessly available for repurposing, from long-form traditional television formats 
through to myriad short forms of content. As Collins (2011) argues, ‘Increasingly, 
television is retailed through themed, rather than mixed, channels and, to a lesser 
extent, video on demand (VOD)’	   (Collins, 2011: 1210–1211), with recent 
developments in television being driven by ‘media-rich content and user take-up’ 
(Debrett, 2009: 819). 
    From short clips on Internet video sharing websites such as YouTube to video-
looping formats such as Vine, public service television services such as BBC 
Television are under pressure to spread PSM across multiple platforms as such 
services increase in popularity. This has necessitated what is known in the discourse 
as taking a ‘360-degree approach’ to production, strategy and commissioning (Doyle, 
2010: 432; Doyle, 2013a: 29; Thompson, 2006 as cited in Smith and Steemers, 2007: 
50), with PSM an important part of driving the wider 360-degree concept within the 
UK creative industries, especially in the independent production sectors (Bennett et 
al., 2012). 
    The concept of the multi-platform approach ‘refers to a strategic approach where 
media companies are focused on making or putting together products and services 
with a view towards delivery and distribution of that content proposition on not just 
one but across multiple platforms’ (Doyle, 2015: 51), or more simply, the term ‘multi-
platform formats … describes the convergence between mass media and personal 
media’  (Enli, 2008: 106). The necessity of adopting a multi-platform approach across 
much of the media sector has mainly been driven by market innovation and 
competition, with impacts on market organisation (Evens, 2010) and ‘an acceleration 
in the pace of innovation and change in the sector’ (Biggam, 2015: 89). For example, 
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newspapers that first made the transition to being provided online and which were 
mainly text-based news services have morphed into full multi-media organisations, 
producing video, audio and interactive content in massive quantities alongside their 
core news functions (Doyle, 2013b; 2015; Schlesinger and Doyle, 2015). In this 
process, journalists are increasingly under pressure to be multi-skilled so as to 
function in the newsroom (Fenton, 2010). 
    Away from the market and the imperatives for survival in a crowded sector, and 
with the rise of major new players that cross genres and forms of content – such as 
Amazon and Netflix, variously producing, hosting and distributing paid-for and 
advertiser funded content – PSM organisations have also had to adopt a multi-
platform approach (Debrett, 2009). In her study, Enli (2008: 117) found that ‘multi-
platform formats have the potential to strengthen the position of public service 
broadcasting in the age of convergence’, with Doyle (2010: 436) noting that the 
‘primary concern is public value and audience welfare rather than profits and so 
strategic motives are more wide-ranging’.   
    In the case of the BBC, a multi-platform strategy allows it to attract audiences in 
competition with commercial broadcasters, not for market share, but for audience 
reach and share of viewing hours. Turning to the first point, far from the lazy-
shorthand that PSM organisations do not need to worry about audiences in the way 
that commercial organisations do, the BBC is required through its governance 
framework to focus on audience reach (and is assessed on success in that area), in 
addition to the monitoring of audience appreciation. In addition to the ten-yearly 
reviews that take place in the run up to Charter Renewal, BBC policy and BBC 
services are continually subject to review, which fits with Debrett’s (2009: 822) 
argument that public service broadcasters (PSBs) face ‘new pressures for more 
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rigorous systems of performance measurement and accountability’. However, to the 
apparent chagrin of the BBC’s detractors, the Corporation performs remarkably well 
on the audience reach measurement: for example, BBC One’s ‘15 minute weekly 
reach’ was 75% in 2013-14 (BBC Trust, 2014b: 12); in multi-channel homes, the 
BBC’s overall television services had a 32.4% audience share in 2013, an increase 
since 2004 (29.5%), and which compares very favourably with ITV’s 23.1% share 
(Ofcom, 2014: 191). On an individual channel basis, BBC One has a 21% audience 
share, which compares glaringly, for example, with Sky One’s 1% audience share 
(Ofcom, 2014: 196).  
    In the history of digitisation in UK media, the BBC has played a key role in the 
development of DTT in the UK and the adoption of the Internet. The move from 
analogue broadcasting to DTT was completed in Autumn 2012, augmenting satellite 
and cable television provision in the UK. The BBC was required to play a leading role 
in the UK's digital switchover plans (since 2002) (Smith and Steemers, 2007: 43), and 
more generally, in the role of Building Digital Britain (see Iosifidis, 2007: 14). It was, 
however, the adding to the BBC of the Internet as a third main strand after television 
and radio in the 1990s – the so-called ‘third great arm’ of the Corporation (Brevini, 
2013: 118) – that takes us to a discussion of how BBC Internet activities developed 
into its current online offering, to the point whereby it became a conceptual 
possibility for BBC Three to become online-only. Beginning with a number of ‘proof 
of concept’ websites in the mid-1990s (Thorsen, 2012: 19), the development of the 
BBC’s online presence was on-going for some time before the use of the Internet 
became an official strand of the BBC’s work. For example the Corporation’s coverage 
of the 1995 financial budget, coverage of the UK’s handover of Hong Kong to China, 
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and the death of Princess Diana all had some accompanying web presence (Thorsen, 
2012: 19).  
    Later on 4 November 1997, BBC News Online went live (Allan and Thorsen: 2011, 
p.22), while BBC Online was given approval by the Secretary of State for DCMS on 
28 October 1998 becoming a ‘core public service’ (BBC/Graf, 2004: 87). Moreover, 
Moe (2010: 9) notes that the Royal Charter that followed in 2006 amounted to putting 
‘online service on equal footing with radio and television’. Finally, the most major 
development from the BBC in recent years was the Christmas 2007 launch of the 
iPlayer, having received approval in the BBC Trust’s April 2007 PVT (Brevini, 2013: 
122). Thorsen (2012: 25) notes that the history of the iPlayer dated back as far as 
2003, when it was known as the Integrated Media Player, and later termed the 
MyBBCPlayer in a 2005 speech by the then Director General Mark Thompson. Later 
we return to a discussion of how BBC Three’s move online fits with the BBC’s 
overall approach to the Internet and television, and the current arrangements 
regarding payment of the television licence fee. 
  
 
Current UK trends in television viewing: on TV and online 
 
While all kinds of claims and counter-claims surround the television viewing habits of 
‘young people’ (BBC’s Three target age range of 16-34 extends well beyond what we 
might conventionally term ‘young’), the only reliable way to discuss this subject is 
with reference to empirical data. Despite this, the original announcement to move 
BBC Three online was met with arguments from among others, musician Jarvis 
Cocker, who confidently proclaimed: ‘young people don't watch television’ and ‘It’s 
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all about tablets for them so we shouldn’t be too bothered’ (Cocker as cited in BBC 
Newsbeat, 2014). As will be outlined, the notion that television is no longer watched 
by the ‘young’ is empirically far from correct. What follows is a summary of the 
relevant data that was most up-to-date at the time the BBC Three proposals were first 
published.   
    First, the vast majority of the UK population’s television viewing is to television as 
broadcast live. In 2013, 89% of television was viewed live as compared to 90% in 
2012 (BBC Trust, 2014b: 9). If the measurement is changed, to the slightly broader 
category of ‘total time spent watching audiovisual content’, 69% of viewing is to 
television as broadcast live for all adults (Ofcom, 2014: 106). On-demand viewing, 
such as through the BBC iPlayer amounts to 5% only, while what Ofcom terms 
‘downloaded or streamed’ television (including Netflix) amounts to 3% of viewing 
time (Ofcom, 2014: 106). 
    When this is compared to the 16-24 age category, we find 50% of viewing of 
television as broadcast live, and 16% to recorded television; at 7% of viewing to on-
demand television, younger people in this age group are only 2 percentage points 
higher than the general population (Ofcom, 2014: 106). The remainder of BBC 
Three’s target age group (25-34) still consume 61% of television as broadcast live 
(Ofcom, 2014: 106). In both the 16-24 and 25-34 age demographics, there is a 6% 
share of downloaded or streamed viewing (Ofcom, 2014: 106). Overall, when the 
pace of change is addressed over a seven-year period in ‘live versus time-shifted’ 
viewing, 206 minutes were watched live per day in 2013 as compared to 212 in 2007, 
a very minor change (Ofcom, 2014: 198).  
    Second, watching television on a ‘TV set’ (so termed in the Ofcom terminology to 
distinguish this from the use of other devices to watch television), ‘dominates total 
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media and communications consumption time’ (Ofcom, 2014: 54). As a ‘proportion 
of media and communications time’ spent on different activities, 37% of all adult’s 
media time is spent watching ‘TV or films on a TV set’ (Ofcom, 2014: 60). However, 
when addressed by age, this drops to 24% for 16-24 year olds, and 31% for 25-34 
year olds (Ofcom, 2014: 60). Third, trends in viewing among 16-34 year olds requires 
attention. The BBC Trust (2014b) reported that for younger viewers ‘they spread their 
television consumption further beyond the five PSB channels, amongst a wider range 
of digital channels, with the five PSB channels only accounting for 42% of their 
viewing, compared to 53% amongst all viewers’ (BBC Trust, 2014b: 10). 
 
BBC Three: status as a Digital Terrestrial Television channel  
 
Since it went on air in 2003, BBC Three had been the Corporation’s core television 
service aimed at the older teenager/‘young’ adult audience. The channel has long been 
associated with creative and edgy programming, including Bad Education, Being 
Human and Gavin & Stacey. Its main entertainment offerings fell squarely within the 
BBC’s mission statement, upholding the historic Reithian principles of information, 
education and entertainment. While BBC Three’s overall budget was £86 million in 
2014-15 (BBC Trust, 2014b: 2), the content budget had ‘been falling over the last two 
years and, as a result, there has been a decline in the hours of originations shown on 
the channel’ (BBC, 2015: 21). These fell from 83% in 2010 to 76% in 2013. 
Stemming from the 2010 freeze of the television licence fee, the Delivering Quality 
First programme of cuts that followed led to BBC Television being required to find 
saving of ‘annual savings of £250 million by 2016-17’ (BBC Trust, 2014b: 33). Had 
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BBC Three stayed on air, its budget would have been cut by more than 9% by 2016-
17, from its 2014 level (BBC Trust, 2014b: 34).  
    As a broadcast television channel, BBC Three was broadcast from 1900-0400 each 
day, with a ‘mixed schedule encompassing: hourly news bulletins, current affairs, 
drama, entertainment, music, arts, animation and factual programming’ (BBC, 2015: 
21). Its remit in its Service Licence was:  
 
 to bring younger audiences to high quality public service broadcasting through 
 a mixed-genre schedule of innovative UK content featuring new UK talent. 
 The channel should use the full range of digital platforms to deliver its content 
 and to  build an interactive relationship with its audience. (BBC Trust, 2014b: 
 1) 
 
In detail, BBC Three was required by the BBC Trust to broadcast ‘at least 30 hours of 
new music and arts programmes each year’, ‘at least 100 hours of new factual 
programmes each year’, and ‘at least 15 hours of new current affairs programmes 
each year’, which in each case could include acquisitions (BBC Trust, 2014c: 4-5). 
Strongly performing components of these strands included BBC Three’s 
documentaries such as Life and Death Row and Our War (BBC, 2015: 26), the kind of 
programming which the BBC is required to deliver in order to meet the requirement 
that it ‘serve the public interest’ (DCMS, 2006a: 3.1). These quotas were either met in 
2013 (current affairs programming), or surpassed (with 47 hours of new music and 
arts and 115 of factual programming) (BBC, 2015: 21).  
    As part of a wider Service Review of four television channels, BBC Three last had 
its performance reviewed in line with the BBC Trust’s RQIV (Reach, Quality, Impact, 
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Value) framework in 2014. In that review, the channel was found on the whole to be 
performing strongly. On reach, BBC Three was found to be capturing ‘26% of 16-34 
year old viewers including around one million viewers who do not watch other BBC 
television channels’ (BBC Trust, 2014b: 14). However, ‘this has fallen and its decline 
has been greater amongst viewers under 55 than among those over 55’ (BBC Trust, 
2014b: 14). The review also found that BBC Three’s overall Appreciation Index (the 
measurement used to quantify audience appreciation of BBC services) was relatively 
stable, albeit falling, though was higher than that for BBC One in 2013-14, and only 
marginally lower than that for BBC Two.  
  
 
Initial proposals to make BBC Three an online-only entity 
 
When the BBC presented its formal proposals on BBC Three to the BBC Trust (and 
on a number of other related changes), the proposals acknowledged cost cutting as a 
primary reason for the planned changes, but also highlighted the perceived necessity 
of reinventing BBC Three to ensure the channel remains relevant to younger 
audiences (BBC, 2015). A summary of the changes as originally proposed are 
outlined in this section:  
 
1. It was proposed that BBC Three would become an online-only entity, and 
accordingly would disappear from carriers such as the main DTT platform Freeview; 
the Controller of BBC Three, Damian Kavanagh, asserted that this did not mean that 
BBC Three was closing (Kavanagh, 2014), and was not available for sale (1). Instead 
the Corporation insisted that while moving BBC Three online might change the 
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medium of delivery and the form of the content and that it would remain a core BBC 
service. By means of delivery of the newly launched channel, it was proposed that 
that a new BBC Three website be set up and that BBC One and the Red Button also 
be used for the delivery of content (BBC, 2015: 23). The new online platform would 
have a budget with an ‘80/20’ divide, with the greater percentage going to full-length 
television programing, and the lesser to ‘new form digital content’ (Kavanagh, 2014).  
    In its initial proposals the BBC suggested that the new online platform would 
include alternative forms of multi-media storytelling and blog content, which the 
BBC has argued amounts to a ‘radical change’ (Kavanagh, 2014), as online budgets 
are normally distinct from programme making budgets at the BBC. Additional 
proposals published at the same time were that the DTT channel slot freed up by 
closing BBC Three would be redeployed to launch a ‘BBC One+1’ time-shifted 
channel; that the main children’s channel CBBC would be extended by two hours per 
day; that the iPlayer would be ‘enhanced’ by ‘(i) premiering programmes and (ii) 
including selected content from third parties’ (BBC, 2015: 1). 
 
2. The BBC argued that there were three main reasons for the move online of BBC 
Three as part of its ‘Strategic Rationale’. First, it was argued that the BBC had a 
falling income, given the context of the cuts to spending that the Corporation was 
required to make from 2010 (as discussed above). The Corporation argued that rather 
than cut programming budgets across the BBC’s main services, that cutting one entire 
service from broadcast television would ensure that quality is maintained (BBC, 
2015: 1). It was asserted that the move would save c£50 million per annum, with the 
money primarily reinvested into drama on BBC One (c£20 million), with the 
remainder spent on the BBC iPlayer and on the online-only BBC Three (BBC, 2015: 
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19). The precise content budget for BBC Three online would be c£30 million (BBC, 
2015: 7). In its initial plans the BBC acknowledged that its plans were ‘largely cost 
neutral’ (BBC, 2015: 71), and thus more about a redistribution of licence fee money 
as opposed a saving in real monetary terms (albeit, the later rejected BBC One+1 
proposal was being factored into the costs at this stage).  
    Second, the BBC suggested that there is a ‘changing TV landscape’, given ‘the 
emergence of global media brands offering new types of services, using new business 
models and investing higher levels in global genres such as drama and entertainment’ 
(BBC, 2015: 16). Here the BBC was referring in particular to the rise of the global 
VOD providers Netflix and Amazon, who ‘are forcing incumbents to consolidate 
across the value chain in order to compete’ (BBC, 2015: 16). The channel’s controller 
argued that BBC Three launched ‘before the iPhone, Facebook, SBTV, Netflix, 
Snapchat, driverless cars and a man jumping from space. The world’s changed and 
what millennials and Generation Z want and expect from the BBC has changed’ 
(Kavanagh, 2014).  
    Third, the BBC pointed to ‘Changing audience viewing habits’, epitomised by the 
changes in the devices in which people are viewing television on, and the manner in 
which they are watching it. Assessing these trends the BBC stated that its weekly 
reach had fallen across the period 2010-2014 on three measurements: the total reach 
of the BBC, BBC Television, and its specific reach to 16-34 year olds (BBC, 2015: 
17). These concerns were encapsulated in comments made by the then BBC Director 
of Television, Danny Cohen, who asked: ‘Do we sit back as a legacy company and 
watch as generational change bites away at our impact or do we take a place at the 
forefront of that change?’ (BBC/Cohen, 2014).  
 
	  	   14	  
BBC Trust Decision 
 
The BBC Trust reached its decision on the outcome of the PVT in two stages. In June 
2015 it announced that the proposal to add a BBC+1 service was not allowable, with 
the BBC Trust drawing on Ofcom’s market assessment to conclude that the change 
‘would have the greatest adverse market impact of any of the proposals, capturing 
viewing share for the BBC at the expense of commercial channels and reducing the 
profitability, in particular, of ITV and Channel 5’ (BBC Trust, 2015a: 4). At this stage 
the BBC Trust agreed the changes to the iPlayer and the CBBC channel. Setting out 
various clauses at this point before finally agreeing to the BBC Three move in 
November 2015, the BBC Trust’s final conditions for the online-only BBC Three 
included: ‘that all BBC Three long-form programmes must be broadcast in slots on 
BBC One and Two, on an ongoing basis, effective immediately on closure of the 
BBC Three TV channel’ (BBC Trust, 2015b). BBC One and Two were also required 
in their service licences to ‘ensure continued creative risk-taking and experimenting 
with new talent and ideas’ (BBC Trust, 2015b), and also to produce programming 
specifically aimed at younger viewers. 
 
 
A BBC Three ‘OF the digital world’ 
 
In its main proposals for moving BBC Three online, the BBC set out that the online-
only BBC Three would not be a simple streaming-online of the kind of content and 
schedules that previously appeared on its DTT channel. Rather, the Corporation 
argued that it would be reinvented as a new kind of channel: ‘We need to ensure that 
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the new BBC Three isn’t just IN the digital world, but that it is OF the digital world… 
This is not about picking up a TV channel (or its audience) and simply putting it 
online’ (BBC, 2015: 23). In this section the programming approach in the proposals 
and how the BBC proposed it would deliver them is discussed first, followed by an 
assessment of the extent to which a multi-platform strategy can be discerned in the 
proposals. 
 
 
The editorial pillars and their delivery 
 
The BBC outlined how BBC Three’s programming online would be structured around 
two ‘editorial pillars’ in its initial proposals. The first pillar, Make Me Laugh, is 
intended to extend the channel’s reputation for comedy, and to focus on ‘personality-
led entertainment’ (BBC, 2015: 24), to ensure that BBC Three will ‘retain its industry 
position as a “go-to” commissioner for emerging talent and will continue to act as a 
“nursery slope” talent for BBC One and Two’ (BBC, 2015: 25). Make Me Think is 
intended to ‘cover drama, flagship factual, authored documents, news and current 
affairs’ (BBC, 2015: 24–25). What has emerged at the main BBC Three website 
(BBC Three, 2016) (BBC Three content also appears on the main iPlayer website and 
mobile applications) is a mixed offering of full-length programmes, short video clips, 
and articles authored for BBC Three. A ‘What's new this week on BBC Three?’ and 
the ‘Daily Drop’ section provide the equivalent of a schedule for a broadcast channel, 
planned to fulfill the original claim that ‘it will be important to have a curated content 
offering that is refreshed frequently so that the new BBC Three is a dynamic and 
lively service rather than a static library of content’ (BBC, 2015: 28).  
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    We saw above how the BBC wants to ensure that the online-only BBC Three ‘is 
OF the digital world’ (BBC, 2015: 23). However, the Corporation went further at the 
time by suggesting that the ‘new BBC Three could be the arrowhead for the whole 
industry - shaping and extending the “TV” market beyond linear and building demand 
for new forms of content’ (Kavanagh, 2014). Elsewhere it was suggested that the new 
online-only BBC Three would provide ‘an opportunity for BBC Management to test 
and understand how public service broadcasting can and should evolve in a digital 
world’ (BBC, 2015: 22) within the present Charter period. The notion here is that the 
online-only BBC Three might serve as a blueprint for future changes to the remainder 
of the BBC’s television channels. 
 
 
A multi-platform strategy for BBC Three: ‘members…not passive consumers’ 
 
The multi-platform approach has been prevalent in PSM, as previously discussed. In 
terms of how the online-only BBC Three might engage young audience members 
under the proposals, the BBC Director General Tony Hall stated:  
 the new BBC Three will be a great example of how we can reinvent the public 
 service for the digital world - using their talent, appearing on the platforms 
 and devices that they use and talking to them as equals and partners. (BBC, 
 2014a) 
In this comment we can see encapsulated a clear emphasis in the BBC’s plans in 
relation to its multi-platforming approach – or as described elsewhere by the BBC, a 
	  	   17	  
‘Multi-platform presence’ (BBC, 2014b: 6) – as a means of securing audience 
engagement with those increasingly consuming media online. Previously, there had 
been a move away from the term multiplatform at the BBC (Doyle, 2016: 696). 
However, the BBC plans to continue to utilise and expand on its presence on other 
Internet platforms for the online-only BBC Three, such as on Youtube, Facebook, 
Twitter, Instagram and Tumblr, with Buzzfeed a potential for the publication of 
‘listicles’ (BBC, 2015: 32–34).  In so doing, the Corporation is seeking to cover the 
major Social Networking Service (SNS) platforms. In addition, Kavanagh notes that 
the strategy would also extend to person-to-person services, such as Snapchat and 
WhatsApp (Kavanagh, 2015).  
    The theme of participation through a multi-platform approach fits with the BBC’s 
wider approach to the online-only BBC Three, with Kavanagh arguing that the 
changes to BBC would bring about a change in the status of the audience. On this 
Kavanagh suggested that bringing viewers into a new relationship with the 
Corporation can be achieved: ‘By fostering a more open relationship through new 
platforms and social media our audience would become members of new BBC Three, 
not passive consumers’ (Kavanagh, 2014). The plans to use a more extensive multi-
platform approach fits with the use in BBC policy discourse of the term ‘BBC AV 
content’ (eg. BBC, 2015: 62). While the usage of ‘BBC content’ has been 
commonplace for some time, it is usually used to refer to ‘content’ in its more 
traditional usage, eg. some material produced by the organisation. Here we see the 
adoption of the word in its market usage, more common in the commercial media 
environment.  
   Previously the BBC commonly used ‘programming’ to describe what now becomes 
‘AV content’. However, present in these proposals is the idea that a multi-platform 
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approach may also flow in the other direction, from BBC Three online back to the 
Corporation’s main channels. The intention that new BBC Three ‘long-form’ 
programmes would also be shown on BBC One and BBC Two (BBC, 2015: 23) was 
ratified in the BBC Trust’s decision on the proposals, with the condition that this 
would apply to all long-form programmes (BBC Trust, 2015b). Thus the channel 
controller framed this by saying, ‘In reality new BBC Three programmes will be 
available to more people, and seen by a wider audience, than they are now’ 
(Kavanagh, 2015). 
 
Audience, market and regulatory implications  
While we have already addressed how BBC Three has been structured and delivered 
as a nascent online-only entity, it is necessary to consider the audience, market and 
regulatory implications of the move. First, in relation to the impact on the audience, 
the BBC Trust commissioned media consultants Communications Chambers (CC) to 
carry out research on the proposals. In its quantitative research, CC found that of the 
four proposals it surveyed on (BBC Three, BBC+1, CBBC, iPlayer) that the BBC 
Three proposal ‘was the least popular of the four propositions, both at a personal and 
societal level’ (BBC/Communications Chambers, 2014: 4), finding 32% of people 
unfavourable towards the proposals for the channel at the personal level 
(BBC/Communications Chambers, 2014: 6). CC also found that ‘29% of respondents 
thought they would use the revised service at least monthly’ compared to the then 
monthly channel reach of 64% (BBC/Communications Chambers, 2014: 4). 
    Second, in relation to market impact, CC modelled what the likely impact would be 
on the wider broadcasting market. It addressed how the changes would affect the 
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BBC’s share of television viewing and what the impact on the commercial channels 
was likely to be. CC found that as BBC Three’s 1.5% viewing share of broadcast 
television would cease, the total loss for BBC Television’s share of viewing hours by 
2017 would be -2.66% (BBC/Communications Chambers, 2015: 24). For the 
following commercial channels, the impact on share of viewing hours would be: 
+1.33% (ITV); +1.59% (Channel 4); +1.35% (Channel 5) (BBC/Communications 
Chambers, 2015: 24). Thus, while the move would result in a smaller share of 
viewing for the BBC, the main commercial channels would all be beneficiaries. 
    Third, in relation to the regulatory implications of the BBC Three move, the BBC 
outlined the following assumption in its PVT submission materials that as ‘a new 
online service, BBC Three long form programmes would not be subject to the current 
television quota framework but would be subject to our voluntary online external 
spend quota’ (BBC, 2015: 35). Some background is needed to give context here: the 
‘BBC is accountable for a number of public commitments each year, including 
programming and production quotas, service licence commitments, and promises 
made as part of its Statements of Programming Policy’ (BBC, 2014b: i). The 
framework for this lies in the BBC’s Agreement (DCMS, 2006b), which sets out the 
parameters for the ‘programming quotas for original productions’ (section 49). 
Crucially this applies only to the UK Public Television Services, which is presumably 
why the BBC has considered the online-only BBC Three to be exempt. In the 2013-14 
period, the most recent published figures available, BBC Three had a quota of 70% of 
original productions, which it surpassed by delivering 76% (BBC, 2014b: 2). While 
the BBC noted that absence of the current television quota framework from the 
online-only BBC Three should be reviewed after a period of two years, it was 
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somewhat remarkable that it is not expanded on in the context of a 90-page report 
given the importance of this point. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
In this section we return to the questions asked above: to what extent does the 
evidence provided to the regulator in support of the proposals provide rationale for the 
decision reached? Is the decision to move BBC Three online as radical a decision as is 
being claimed? What might the impact of the decision be on the television licence fee, 
as people in the UK watching live TV online must still pay the licence fee? 
 
 
Assessing the BBC’s rationale for the BBC Three proposals 
 
Of the three main arguments offered by the BBC for the proposals – falling income, a 
changing television landscape, and changing trends in television viewing – it is 
argued here that the falling income argument is the one most backed up by the 
evidence considered, followed by the changing trends argument. In contrast, it is 
argued that the changing television landscape is comparatively much weaker. First, on 
the falling income argument, that the BBC’s financial outlook is becoming more 
difficult is without dispute. In July 2015, some time after the BBC Trust’s review 
began, the Corporation was handed a licence fee settlement by the government in 
which the BBC was required to take on the funding of free television licences for the 
over-75s. This has meant that licence fee income for the BBC could fall from £3.7 
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billion to £3.1 billion, meaning the debate continues over how the remaining funds 
should be divided. The BBC argued that cutting one channel from broadcast 
television was essential rather than choosing ‘to further ‘salami slice’ the budgets of 
our other services’ (BBC, 2015: 77). However, because the BBC has sold the idea of 
an online-only BBC Three as a positive step it can now be forced by its detractors into 
accepting that it can deliver similar levels of content despite making substantial 
changes to its services (in this case BBC Three as a broadcast television service). In 
other words, the BBC has shown that it can deal with a lower overall budget without a 
noticeable drop off in content, which could perhaps be a harbinger of more budget 
cuts. Moreover, for the BBC’s detractors, the argument could accordingly run that if 
you can deliver similar content for less, then more channels could be moved online 
and funding for the BBC further diminished. 
   Second, the changing trends in television viewing argument is perhaps the next 
strongest argument as backed up by the evidence. The quantifiable changing viewing 
habits among the young, especially in the 16-24 demographic of BBC Three’s wider 
target audience, cannot be ignored. While we have viewed them as they stand, who 
can predict what another five to ten years of social change and technological 
innovation will bring? However, as outlined in a previous section, the viewing of 
broadcast television viewed as live in the UK dominates all television consumption 
and audiovisual consumption. The fact that the BBC has been required by the BBC 
Trust to broadcast all long-form BBC Three programmes on BBC One and Two 
mitigates against being online-only, as much of the audience (even among the young) 
still consumes television on DTT. Here Danny Cohen’s June 2015 comments are 
relevant, when he suggested that BBC Four could possibly follow suit after BBC 
Three in moving to be online-only (Martinson, 2015), although doubt was later cast 
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on this (2). This certainly shows some incoherence in the BBC’s argument: if there is 
a phased transition online of those channels that are most watched by the young, then 
the next channel to move would not be BBC Four, with a much older audience (more 
logically the CBBC channel would move online). Thus, the changing trends argument 
loses traction if it is not followed logically in the future by beginning with those 
channels with a younger viewership. 
    Third, the changing television landscape argument is the weakest that the 
Corporation forwarded for moving BBC Three online, and is the one that the BBC 
provides the least evidence to support. The rise of Netflix and the Amazon VOD 
services, replete with originally commissioned content, are primarily a threat to the 
commercial broadcasters and their online offerings. While stating ‘the competitive 
environment for BBC iPlayer is set to become significantly more challenging as 
major global VOD providers … establish a foothold in the market’ (BBC, 2015: 45), 
the BBC fails to follow the logic of the argument. Here the primary competition is 
between those companies offering subscription services, with the non-subscription but 
rather licence fee funded BBC iPlayer falling outside of this.  
   However, even when the issue is examined empirically, the argument still appears 
weak: as shown above, at the time the category that included providers such as Netflix 
only has a 6% viewing share among the 16-34 age demographic, of those accessing 
paid-for services, whereas television viewed live had a 50% (16-24) and 61% share 
(25-34) (Ofcom, 2014: 106). When the category that the iPlayer falls into is added, 
these shares are 57% and 67% respectively (Ofcom, 2014: 106). Among the BBC 
Three target audience, paid-for streamed services are still a minority pursuit (3). 
While such an argument is one which might form a useful part of an overall 
discussion on changes in the television marketplace, these are changes that the BBC is 
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currently negotiating successfully and thus it does not need to rely on weaker 
arguments, as has been the case here. 
 
 
How radical are the proposals? 
 
The BBC suggested in its initial proposals that the plans for BBC Three amounted to 
a radical departure, and to draw on the title of this article that they might redefine 
public service broadcasting in the digital age. In this section it will be argued that 
they are indeed radical. The point previously discussed, that the BBC is working 
under the assumption that the original productions quota would not be applied to BBC 
Three as an online-only entity sets a very interesting precedent, and yet is one which 
could radically alter how PSM in the UK is framed. The BBC Trust did not fully deal 
with this matter in its initial published decision, only referring to the matter in relation 
to the final period of linear broadcast, and apparently referring to it in relation to how 
the quotas affected the forecasting necessary for measuring impact of the channel 
ceasing broadcast (BBC Trust, 2015c: 103; 118). 
    Until further clarification is brought to bear upon this, it appears as a ground-
breaking proposal, and very illuminating both on this case and for the future of the 
BBC. As an important plank in the BBC’s governance, which in addition to a raft of 
other regulations help demarcate it from commercial television, the quotas and the 
extent to which the BBC exceeds them offers an important argument for PSM (BBC, 
2014b: 2). With the original productions quota missing from BBC Three, the rationale 
for it existing as a key PSM offering is harder to make. While the online-only BBC 
Three would still be required to contribute to the Corporation’s public purposes 
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(BBC, 2015: 46) (4), the argument that BBC Three can stand alone from other 
competitors on this particular measurement is lost.  
    If the online-only BBC Three is to be outside of production quotas, will the same 
go for other television channels moved online at a later date? As noted above, BBC 
Four could potentially move online also: would it also be exempt from the original 
productions quotas? If all BBC Television channels eventually go online-only, but the 
BBC is to keep its production quotas, then why allow BBC Three from the outset to 
avoid this requirement? While the Corporation notes, ‘given the experimental nature 
of BBC Three online, we would suggest a review after two years’ (BBC, 2015: 35), 
there is a strong likelihood that this could set a precedent. The new BBC board – 
announced in the White Paper for Charer Renewal in 2016 (DCMS, 2016) – must set 
an overall plan for how it intends to deal with television channels and their move 
online, with Ofcom as the BBC’s incoming regulator giving its view. Rather than 
taking a piecemeal approach – BBC Three now, BBC four later, possibly followed by 
BBC Parliament and later the BBC News channel – the Corporation must make an 
overall case for delivery of television online. The failure to do so could concede 
further ground to those who are vociferously arguing for the dramatic cutting back of 
the BBC. However, this wider argument needs framed within a discussion of the 
future of the licence fee, to which we turn now. 
 
 
The implications for the television licence fee 
 
Television licence fee payers in the UK have for some time been required to pay for 
services outside of television and radio. There has therefore been a disconnect for 
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many years between the licence fee and its exclusive use to fund broadcast media. As 
discussed above, the BBC began developing its online services in the 1990s, later 
becoming a core public service. The 2006 Royal Charter (DCMS, 2006a) cemented 
the position of BBC Online. However, BBC Online’s budget of (£174 million) is a 
fraction of the money spent on BBC One (13.3%) (BBC, 2014c: 5); for example, the 
total BBC Online budget represents only 5% of the licence fee, compared to BBC 
Television’s 66% (BBC, 2014c: 5).  
    While licence fee payers who do not use online services may have become used to 
these arrangements, it is a seismic shift to divert a part of the television budget to 
become provided online-only, especially when it may not be subject to the same 
regulatory requirements. There is direct correlation here with the plans to focus 
strongly on a multi-platform approach, as discussed above, with BBC Three being an 
online-only entity. The funding for BBC Three, out of the television budget, will see 
increasing amounts of that money spent on content additional even to the channel’s 
main website for distribution. Those paying the television licence (in its present form) 
and without an Internet connection, will find ever more content lying outside of what 
they can access. 
    The continued clause whereby users of BBC Television online – through the 
current live streaming of the Corporation’s channels – need to purchase a television 
licence, while those who only use catch-up services do not, is of current importance in 
the debate surrounding the proposed changes to BBC Three. The loophole that allows 
for internet catch-up without paying a television licence is problematic for the future 
funding of the Corporation. This issue has been discussed over the ten past years or so 
(Cooper, 2007), while the July 2015 licence fee settlement (DCMS, 2015) and the 
White Paper for Charter Renewal (DCMS, 2016) committed the government to 
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introducing legislation to close the loophole. However, the White Paper leaves the 
question of how the matter of licence fee enforcement will be conducted with regards 
to the iPlayer open, stating rather equivocally that ‘The government will discuss 
verification and other options with the BBC and look at the best way of implementing 
this, including through regulations if needed’ (DCMS, 2016: 95). 
   Finally, there is a point to be made on the age demographics involved in these BBC 
Three proposals. The age demographic that the channel covers (16-34), includes that 
group which are most likely to begin paying for their own licence fee when they first 
move out of home. This group, on the whole, will not have been responsible for 
paying the licence fee when living with parents or guardians below the age of 16. 
Following BBC Three’s move online, this group may become ever more used to the 
lack of a requirement to pay for a licence fee to access BBC services. While there are 
a few other clauses to consider – such as the possible demise of the fee itself, and the 
fact that people in this age demographic still access many other BBC Television 
services – it nevertheless may lead to a cultural change among younger BBC users.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
   In their large scale study, Bennett et al. (2012: 51) found in some of their interviews 
with practitioners across the independent production sector the view that ‘the 
emphasis on iPlayer by the BBC views the internet as “just a bunch of pipes for 
delivering telly through”’, with ‘a feeling that the Corporation will lose creative 
innovation and leadership in multiplatform PSB content’.  This insightful comment 
raises a similar question for the BBC Three proposals: can the BBC make good on its 
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commitment to not simply pick ‘up a TV channel (or its audience) [by] putting it 
online’ (BBC, 2015: 23)? As has been argued in this article, the issues that are raised 
through these proposals need to be set into the context of a wider digital strategy for 
the BBC, covering the next Charter period (an eleven year Charter, from the 
beginning of 2017 to the beginning of 2028). While the government has staked out its 
approach to the Corporation in the White Paper (DCMS, 2016), it is now up to the 
BBC to outline how it will proceed. Moreover, the making of changes to services 
(such as in the case of BBC Three) must be accompanied by a much clearer rationale 
if the BBC wants to defend its role while under pressure from its myriad critics. As 
has been argued here, one of the three main arguments that the BBC offered to 
support the BBC Three move online was rather weak, showing a timidity on the part 
of the Corporation in overextending the threat of actors like Netflix to its own 
position as a leading PSM organisation.  
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Notes 
(1) This stemmed from a proposal from Jimmy Mulville and Jon Thoday of the 
independent production companies Avalon and Hat Trick to buy the channel, and to 
secure its future as a broadcast channel. This idea went as far as the authorship of a 
thirteen-page proposal (Midgely, 2015). 
 
(2) In September 2015 the BBC’s Director of Strategy and Digital stated, ‘We are not 
ruling anything in or out, but we don’t have a plan to close BBC4’ (Plunkett, 2015) 
seemingly dampening Cohen’s previous point. 
 
(3) One inconsistency in the presentation of data in the Communications Market 
Report  (Ofcom, 2014) is that while in one place (Ofcom, 2014: 106) on-demand and 
catch-up services (including the iPlayer) and downloaded or streamed (paid-for 
services, including Netflix) are kept separate, in another place they are conflated 
(Ofcom, 2014: 145). Despite this, even on the second measurement, the BBC iPlayer 
still dominates usage, gaining 38% use in 2014, against 14% for Netflix and 6% for 
Amazon’s video service. 
 
(4) The White Paper for Royal Charter renewal shows that the BBC’s previous six 
public purposes are to become a rewritten set of five (DCMS, 2016: 31). 
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